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Abstract 
 
We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the 
factors that explain varying degrees of private involvement 
in the U.S. water sector through public-private partnerships. 
Our estimates suggest that a variety of factors help explain 
greater private participation in this sector. We find that the 
risk to private participants regarding cost recovery is an 
important driver of private participation. The relative cost of 
labor is also a key factor in determining the degree of private 
involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are 
high relative to private wages, private participation is viewed 
as a source of cost savings. We thus find two main drivers of 
greater private involvement: one encouraging private 
participation by reducing risk, and another encouraging 
government to seek out private participation in lowering 
costs. 
JEL classification: H4; H54; H7; L88; L9 
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1. Introduction
After several decades of water delivery privatization, a widespread view among scholars is 
that water delivery is a complex service featuring high contracting costs. In his study of 
concession contract renegotiation, Guasch (2004) documents the high frequency of renegotiation 
in Latin America and the Caribbean water and sanitation services between the mid-eighties and 
2000. Renegotiation affected 74.4 percent of concession contracts in the sector, significantly 
higher than in other important sectors, such as transportation. Moreover, the period of time 
between contract award and renegotiation was only 1.7 years on average (Guasch, 2004). 
Although overall favorable to privatization, Megginson (2005) considers water to be the clearest 
case among user-paid services where privatization has failed to deliver clear welfare 
improvements.
There is now a substantial empirical literature showing that water private delivery has not 
provided superior efficiency and productivity relative to public delivery in most developed 
countries (e.g., Warner and Bel 2008). However, because private participation allows access to 
additional expertise and greater financial capabilities, studies suggest that private participation in 
less-developed countries has delivered improvements in quality and accessibility. Mixed effects of 
privatization in several services have led to reforms that go beyond a pure public/pure private split 
(Warner and Bel, 2008; Bel and Fageda, 2010). Greater use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
is one result of such a trend. In fact, PPPs can be viewed as a way to extend a standard 
procurement method, similar to contracting out. Moral hazard and quality measurement problems, 
among others, have arisen in contracting out (Levin and Tadelis, 2010). Contracting out has 
evolved to include high-powered incentives, which require shifting substantial risk to the private 
partner, to help address those problems. The private partner demands compensation to bear that 
risk however, which requires the public sponsor to pay a risk premium.
The term “public-private partnership” has evolved to encompass any contractual framework 
allowing for greater private sector participation in infrastructure projects than under a traditional 
approach. PPPs range from relatively simple management contracts to complex design-build-
finance-operate (DFBO) contracts, to outright asset sales. 
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Under a traditional design-build (DB) approach, for example, private firms design and 
construct an infrastructure facility on behalf of a public sponsor. The sponsor remains responsible 
for financing, operating, and maintaining the facility. A greater degree of private involvement is 
found in design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) contracts. Under DBOM, the additional duties of 
the private partner(s) include operating and maintaining the facility after it has been built. Both DB 
and DBOM contracts take advantage of private sector incentives and expertise to design and 
build facilities so as to minimize operation and maintenance costs.
Greater private involvement also occurs through design-build-finance-operate-maintain 
(DBFOM) contracts, which extends private participation to the project’s financing. In a typical 
DBFOM contract, the private partner uses some combination of debt and equity to design and 
build a new facility, and then operates and maintains it for a specified time period in exchange for 
the right to collect revenues from facility users over the lease term. Two versions of this project 
type are (a) a greenfield PPP, through which the private partner builds a new facility; and (b) a 
brownfield PPP, through which an upfront concession fee is paid by the private partner in order to 
lease a pre- existing facility. Other contractual types include build-transfer-operate (BTO) 
agreements, under which the private partner owns the facility until its ownership rights are 
transferred to the public sector when construction is finished. Similarly, under a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) agreement, the private partner retains ownership rights until title is transferred at 
the end of the specified operation and maintenance period. In a build-own-operate (BOO) 
agreement, ownership remains with the private partner unless the public sector purchases it.
The contractual diversity facilitated by PPPs has increased the array of types and degrees of 
private involvement in public infrastructure delivery. However, empirical analysis of the motivation 
behind public services privatization has remained largely focused on a clear bifurcation between 
pure-public and pure-private delivery (Bel and Fageda 2007, 2009), with few extensions to other 
mixed forms such as mixed public-private firms (Bel and Fageda, 2010). 
We contribute to the literature by empirically analyzing the factors that explain varying degrees 
of private involvement through PPPs in the water sector. The water sector provides insights 
relevant for the study of PPPs more broadly. First, water distribution involves large investments in 
networks, which makes this sector subject to financial constraints. Second, water sector 
investments typically require long amortization schedules. There is great uncertainty associated 
with long-term changes in demand and other variables. Risk sharing and risk transfer over the life 
of the contract are more important in the water sector than in many other local services. Water 
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services are thus characteristic of other services involving large, sunk investments and long 
contracting periods, such as transportation.  
We explore the determinants of private participation through PPPs in the water sector. Our 
estimates indicate that fiscal and political variables are not relevant for the determination of PPP 
contract type in the water industry. Instead, contract size coverage – our proxy for market 
attractiveness – and the ratio of government and private sector wages, are positively related to 
private partner involvement via PPPs. Thus, lower cost-recovery risk and higher relative public 
sector wages lead to greater private involvement. 
The paper is organized as follows. We next review empirical evidence on the relationship 
between privatization of water delivery, productivity and service efficiency. We then examine 
quality and accessibility. We discuss empirical analysis of factors explaining the degree of water 
privatization in Section 3. Section 4 describes our data and variables. In Section 5, we describe 
our methods and empirical estimates. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2. Privatization of water delivery and wastewater treatment: efficiency, prices 
and quality 
We here provide a brief overview of literature on water services privatization, which can be 
divided into two broad categories. The first focuses on the search for measurable differences in 
productivity or cost efficiency across the two basic ownership forms. This accounts for the majority 
of empirical water privatization studies. The second is a smaller set of studies examining what 
could be characterized as “other outcomes” related to water privatization. These other outcomes 
include the number of connections and the related issue of child mortality from water-borne 
diseases.
With several exceptions, the first set of studies concludes that there are no significant 
differences in productivity and efficiency between public and private water utilities. These 
researchers typically estimate a cost function and include a dummy variable for ownership 
structure. One early and widely cited study is Crain and Zardkoohi (1978), who tested the 
property-rights theory of the firm. They posit that, because privately owned firms feature tradable 
ownership shares, owners are able to capitalize value created through efficiency-enhancing 
activities, and will thus have stronger incentives to undertake such activities, even if the firm 
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operates in a non-competitive environment. Crain and Zardkoohi estimate a cost function derived 
from a Cobb-Douglas production function and included a dummy variable for firm ownership. They 
found that private water utilities were more efficient than their public sector counterparts. 
Alternatively, Feigenbaum and Teeples (1984), using 1970 data, examine 57 private and 262 
public water utilities in the United States. Using both a hedonic cost function and a non-hedonic 
approach, they could not reject the hypothesis that, under either approach, the parameters of the 
cost function were the same for public and private firms. Byrnes, Grosskopf and Hayes (1986) 
examine 68 publicly owned and 59 privately owned U.S. water utilities in 1976. They focus on 
technical and scale efficiencies, and again find that there are no significant differences across 
ownership forms. 
Fox and Hofler (1986) use cross-sectional data for 1981 with a sample of 156 publicly owned 
and 20 privately owned utilities and find no significant difference in technical efficiency across 
public and privately owned firms. They do, however, find differences in allocative efficiency across 
the two ownership types. Battacharyya, Parker, and Raffiee (1994) examine 225 public and 32 
private water utilities in the United States from a 1992 water industry survey. They find that public 
water utilities are more efficient than their private counterparts. Battacharyya et al (1995) find that 
public ownership is more efficient for large water companies, but less efficient for small ones.
Saal and Parker (2001) examine prices and productivity for privatized water and sewer 
companies in England and Wales. They use non-parametric methods to compare growth in labor 
and total factor productivity for the pre-privatization period (1985 to 1990) with the post-
privatization period (1990 to 1999). They find that, despite reductions in the use of labor, that total 
factor productivity did not improve after privatization. They also find that increases in prices 
exceeded increases in cost over the period, which accounts for an observed increase in profits.
Estache and Rossi (2002) extend these studies. They estimate a stochastic cost frontier using 
a sample of 50 water companies from 29 Asian and Pacific regional water companies. Using two 
methods of measuring efficiency, an error components model and a technical efficiency effects 
model, they find no significant differences in efficiency across the two ownership forms.
Several authors (e.g. Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang 2006) note that the highly specific, fixed 
nature of investment in water infrastructure, along with the inherent difficulties in introducing 
competition (except in peripheral services, such as billing and metering), lead to an environment 
where ownership is unlikely to have large effects on efficiency.
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Bel and Warner (2008) conduct a comprehensive survey of all published econometric studies 
from 1970 onwards on the privatization of solid waste and water services. They review thirty-five 
studies in all, seventeen of which examine the water sector. They note that, although many early 
studies used U.S. data, there is significantly more experience with water privatization in Europe. 
They focus on the question of whether the studies generally conclude that privatization reduces 
costs. They did not focus on issues of rates or service quality as related to ownership form. They 
review several theoretical approaches that generate predictions about the effects of ownership on 
cost efficiency.
They find no evidence that water privatization lowers cost. They attribute this to the inherent 
nature of water utility assets, which are sunk, highly specific, have low value in alternative uses, 
with strong natural monopoly characteristics. These attributes make competition –from which 
many of the efficiency benefits are expected to arise – difficult. Meta-regression analysis 
conducted in Bel, Fageda and Warner (2010) finds results that are consistent with the conclusion 
that private delivery of water services does not show significant productivity differences with 
respect to public delivery.
Another set of studies focuses on the effects of water utility ownership on service quality. 
These studies typically examine service coverage, or the number of connections provided, under 
each ownership type. One might be surmise that private for-profit water providers would serve 
wealthier areas while poorer areas would go un-served. Alternatively, the pricing of water services 
may become politicized under government provision, resulting in water prices depressed to the 
point where full cost recovery becomes impossible. Without subsidies, revenues become 
insufficient to fund adequate maintenance or expansion of the network into poor areas, and the 
sector becomes starved for capital. For example, Clarke et al (2009) note that charging prices 
below cost may not benefit the poor in low-income countries because high initial connection costs 
combined with the resultant rationing imply that the poor will be unable to obtain service even if 
they could afford rates that fully covered costs. The question is thus inherently empirical.
Wu and Malaluan (2008) focus on water privatization in Manila, and examine two case studies 
in detail. Those include two private companies that received concession contracts: Maynilad 
Water Services and the Manila Water Company. Their findings corroborate the view that private 
water companies can bring additional capital to bear.
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They find that the two companies increased the total number of water connections by 30 
percent in their first five years of operation, which they state (p. 225) “would have taken (the 
municipal utility) 30 years to achieve on the basis of its historical performance.” They also find that 
worker productivity increased significantly after water privatization, rising from 9.4 staff members 
per 1,000 connections in 1996 to 4.1 per 1,000 connections in 2003. 
Clarke et al (2009) use household-level survey data collected over many years from Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Brazil, where large water privatizations took place. The time and space variation in 
the data allow them to examine how ownership form affects connections. They find that 
privatization increased the share of households with water connections, but find increases in non-
privatized areas, suggesting that observed improvements may be due to factors other than 
privatization. They conclude that, at a minimum, private participation does not harm the poor. 
Similarly, Harris (2003) reports that, after privatization, 60 to 80 percent of new connections in 
the Columbian cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Tunja went to low-income households. 
Clarke and Wallsten (2003) find that, although prices increased after privatization in Dakar, 
Senegal, connections in low-income areas rose faster than did coverage under eight publicly 
managed utilities in Africa.  
In studying service coverage, Galiani et al (2005) examined the impact of water privatization on 
child mortality in Argentina. Young children are particularly vulnerable to water-borne diseases, 
and diarrhea alone accounts for about 15 percent of all childhood deaths. Argentina offers a 
useful case study because it embarked on one of the largest water privatizations in the world in 
the 1990s, allowing sufficient time for study. 
The Argentine privatization included about 30 percent of the country’s municipalities and about 
60 percent of the population. Exploiting this variation across time and space, the authors find that 
the privatization of water utilities is associated with roughly an 8 percent reduction in child 
mortality from water-borne diseases. They find that most of the reduction occurred in low-income 
areas where expansion of the water network was the greatest. 
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Water privatization is clearly an important policy topic. Private delivery has not generally 
delivered increased productivity and efficiency in developed countries. However, private sector 
participation is considered valuable because private firms can access new, large pools of capital, 
which is particularly important in rapidly growing cities in developing countries, where 
municipalities and central governments often lack the resources necessary to provide piped water 
(Hewett and Montgomery 2001). Water privatization has also been seen as a way to depoliticize 
the pricing of water services. Government-owned utilities may price water services below cost, 
which necessitates ongoing subsidies that are difficult for governments in many developing 
countries to pay (Wu and Malaluan 2008).  Nonetheless, more evidence is needed to ascertain 
whether higher prices under private delivery in developed countries (Carpentier et al., 2006; 
Chong et al., 2006; Martínez-Espiñeira et al., 2009; Ruestes and Zschille, 2010) is due to pricing 
water services closer to actual costs or a consequence of competitive failures in the private 
market for service delivery.
3. Background on factors explaining private participation in water services 
PPPs can be viewed as extending the typical procurement method of contracting out. 
Therefore, theoretical and empirical analyses of private delivery of public services provides a 
useful background with which to study why a government will choose a PPP contract to deliver a 
public service, as well as the degree of private involvement in a PPP contract. Bel and Fageda 
(2007, 2009) review the literature on factors explaining local privatization and propose a typology 
distinguishing between different families of variables (fiscal motivations, economic efficiency and 
network effects, and political processes and ideological attitudes). Within the empirical literature 
devoted to analyzing the determinants of privatization of public services (Bel and Fageda 2007, 
2009) only a few papers had been published focusing on water services (e.g. Ménard and 
Saussier, 2000).1 However, in recent years, several multivariate empirical works have appeared 
examining motivations for water privatization. We next review those papers taking into account 
Bel and Fageda’s typology of factors.   
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Using a 2002 sample of 459 counties in 45 U.S. states (out of the 483 counties in charge of 
water supply), Pérard (2009) examines financial and fiscal variables, environmental variables 
(such as density and population), economic, and political variables. 300 of those counties directly 
deliver water supply while 159 outsource the service. The most robust and persistent 
determinants of privatization are fiscal burden, housing density and republican vote (all positively 
associated with privatization), whereas percentage of public employees in the population is 
negatively related to privatization. A similar approach is taken in Bel, Fageda and Mur (2010), who 
use a sample of 73 municipalities from the Spanish region of Aragon, where very small towns 
predominate. Based on those estimates, privatization appears to be positively related to 
investment requirements and budgetary restrictions. The dispersion of population (as a proxy for 
the complexity of service), is instead negatively related to privatization. Additionally, political and 
ideological factors do not appear to significantly influence the privatization decision.
Miralles (2009) applies a duration model to analyze the factors determining the privatization of 
local water services. That method explicitly controls for time when examining the effect of various 
factors the privatization decision. Miralles uses a sample of 133 municipalities between 1980 and 
2002 from Catalonia (Spain) composed of medium and large population-size municipalities. Three 
periods are examined: 1980-1987, 1988-1995, and 1996-2002. Empirical results show that such 
factors as financial constraints, efficiency improvements, industry interests and political factors, 
influence privatization in some periods but not others. The economic environment and the initial 
state of the service in each period examined are important in determining the influence of these 
factors. 
Several studies using Spanish data have been published based on the same data base of 
municipalities of the Andalusia region.2 González-Gómez and Guardiola (2009) and González-
Gómez et al, (2011) use 744 and 741 municipalities respectively for the period 1985-2006. These 
papers use different instrumental techniques and slightly different models to explain local 
government’s privatization decisions. Financial constraints are important in the decision, 
especially for large municipalities. Privatization increases with population, but very large cities 
privatize less than medium size cities. Having private delivery in neighboring municipalities is 
positively related to privatization, whereas politics and ideology does not play a role.3
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These papers suggest that financial constraints may positively affect when large investments 
need to be made, that the intensity of public employment is negatively related to privatization, and 
that political and ideological factors do not significantly influence the privatization decision. In all, 
the reviewed literature confirms that the typology distinguishing between different families of 
variables (fiscal motivations, economic efficiency and network effects, and political processes and 
ideological attitudes), offers a useful framework to analyze the motivations behind government’s 
decisions regarding the public-private delivery decision and, because of this, the degree of private 
involvement in public service delivery. Given this framework, we move beyond the pure 
public/pure private distinction and examine the PPP approach as a hybrid approach. We 
empirically explore these groups of determinants on the degree of private involvement. In the next 
sections we present our empirical strategy.  
4. Data and Variables
We next describe the data, variables, and methods used to evaluate the impact of fiscal, 
political, economic, and service-type variables, together with other controls, on the extent of 
private participation through PPPs at the local level in the U.S. water industry. We begin by 
describing the main data source and discussing our sample. We then define and discuss the 
dependent variables in our empirical analysis, and move to independent variables. This section 
ends with the models to be estimated.
Data 
Our main data source is the International Major Projects Survey 2008 from Public Works 
Financing (October 2008 issue). This survey contains information on 165 PPP projects signed 
from 1988 to 2008 between local governments and private firms for the production and delivery of 
water services in the United States. The data provide detailed information on PPP contracts, 
which ensures examination of a wide range of contract types. This variation is critical for our 
dependent variables measuring the intensity of private involvement and risk transfer to the private 
sector.
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Table 1 displays basic information on the distribution of contractual choice in local PPPs, 
distinguishing between water delivery and wastewater treatment services. Our sample is 
distributed almost evenly between water delivery and water treatment services. PPPs are 
concentrated in two main contract types: Management contracts and build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
contracts. Design and Build (DB) and Asset Sales represent a small number of water sector PPP 
contracts as reported in Public Works Financing.
Table 1. The Distribution of PPPs by Type of Contract in the 2008 International Major 
Projects Survey for Water Services
Type of contract Water Wastewater Full 
Sample
Management Contracts 43 41 84
Design and Build 5 3 8
Concession / BOT type contracts1 34 37 71
Asset Sales 1 1 2
Number observations 83 82 165
Source: International Major Projects Survey 2008, Public Works Financing.
Notes: 1 This group includes the following contracts: BOT, BOO, BOOT, BTO, DBFO, DBO, DBM,   DBOM, 
DFBO, etc.
These contract types imply different degrees of private participation and risk transfer. We thus 
examined two kinds of dependent variables: a four-category ordered contract variable and a 
binary contractual variable. We discuss each in turn. 
Variables
Ordered Contract Variable:
This is an ordered categorical variable that assigns low values to PPP project types featuring 
relatively low private involvement and low risk transfer, and high values to project types featuring 
relatively high private participation and greater risk transfer. In Table 2 we present the type of 
contracts and values designated according to the extent of private involvement.
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Table 2. Categorical dependent variable construction
PPP contract Private
involvement
Risk Sharing
Management Contracts 1 VERY LOW
Design-Build (DB) 2 LOW
Concessions & Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Contracts 3 HIGH
Asset Sale 4 VERY HIGH
Management contracts receive the lowest value, given the low associated level of risk transfer 
to the private partner. In these contracts, private operators simply manage existing infrastructure 
to deliver services. Few, if any, new investments are employed. The risk assumed by the private 
counterpart is thus limited. The next level of private involvement is Design-Built (DB) contracts. 
The private partner designs and constructs water plants, but does not operate the infrastructure, 
and does not provide delivery or treatment services. Although DB contracts for water plant 
construction require large initial investments, which generate risks associated with construction 
and design, the private partner does not bear demand (or market) risk in this case. Risk transfer 
to the private firm is limited to cost uncertainty. DB contracts are thus relatively low risk in the 
spectrum of PPP contracts. Risks associated with construction costs can generally be well 
managed by the private partner. 
Concessions and Build-Operate-Transfer contracts are placed in category 3 because of the 
larger risks assumed by the private partner. Under a BOT contract or a Concession, the private 
partner builds and operates the facility for a pre-specified time period. Facility title is transferred 
back to the public sponsor at the end of that period. The private partner is here assuming 
substantial risk associated with the facility’s construction (i.e. construction cost risk) and operation 
(i.e. operational cost and demand risk). Concessions and BOT contracts add demand risk to the 
construction risk typically assumed by the private partner under DB contracts. For these reasons, 
BOT contracts imply a greater level of private participation. 
The last category is full privatization through asset sales. The private partner here actually 
acquires title to the facility, and assumes all risks associated with its ongoing operation, 
maintenance and refurbishment. We assign this category a value of four, reflecting the highest 
degree of private involvement and risk assumption.     
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Binary Contract:
Both management and DB contracts carry significantly lower levels of risk relative to assets 
sales or concession/BOT-type contracts. Moreover, management contracts are significantly more 
common in the water sector than are Design and Build PPPs. We thus created a second 
dependent variable, which assumes a value of zero if the PPP is a management or a DB 
agreement, and a value of one otherwise. A non-zero value thus includes concessions, BOT-type 
agreements (which include DFBO, DBO, DBM, BOO, DBOM, etc.), and asset sales. This dummy 
variable distinguishes between PPP contracts with a low versus high degree of private 
involvement/risk transfer.
We next discuss independent variables. We consider four variable groups: fiscal variables, 
economic variables, political variables, and basic controls. We discuss the motivation behind each 
regressor, focusing on the role played by relative public-sector salaries as a key driver of the level 
of private PPP participation and risk transfer.
Contract_Coverage: State per capita income in the year prior to the PPP agreement relative to 
project size (or cost) in millions of U.S. dollars. This captures the appeal of the PPP to the private 
sector according to the relative size of the project or the initial cost with respect to the purchasing 
power of the potential market. This ratio is also a proxy for risk transfer to the private sector 
because we account for the difficulty associated with recovering payments involved in the public-
private collaboration. Small contracts in communities with high income per capita are more 
attractive for private participants because initial payments are easily recovered in running the 
PPP. On the contrary, expensive projects in states with relatively poorer consumers generate less 
private sector interest in accepting commercial risk. Our hypothesis that governments undertake 
PPPs that can inspire interest to the private sector predicts a positive sign on this variable. The 
data sources for this variable are Public Works Financing and the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 
Tax_Burden: Tax revenues divided by income in the state where the PPP is signed in the year 
prior to the agreement. This controls for fiscal pressure and the ability of governments to raise 
money from taxpayers in a given state. We predict that this variable will be negatively correlated 
with the level of private PPP involvement because states with higher revenues are likely to be less 
reliant on private investment. The source for this variable is The Tax Foundation, tables entitled 
“State and Local Tax Burdens: All Years, One State 1977-2008.4
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Spending_Limits: Binary variable equal to one if the State in which the municipality resides has a 
law constraining public spending at the municipal level.5 Local governments will have stronger 
incentives to restrict spending if they reside in a State where fiscal limits are enforced. In fact, 
fiscal constraints are transferred from State to local governments. These limits generate more 
willingness to rely on the private sector. We expect this variable to have a positive effect on the 
extent of private involvement. 
Ratio_Wages: Average public-sector wages relative to average private-sector wages in the State. 
This variable captures the cost of public servants relative to private workers in the labor force. If 
the relative cost of public servants is high, local governments are likely to increase private 
participation through PPPs in order to reduce costs. We thus expect a positive relationship 
between this ratio and the degree of private involvement. The source for these data is the
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Republican_Mayor: A binary variable set to one for those cities with a Republican Mayor at the 
time the PPP contract was signed, zero otherwise. This captures a business friendly and general 
market orientation associated with the Republican Party. Democrats may be predisposed to use 
public resources, while Republicans may be more likely to rely on the private sector. Data were 
obtained through direct consultation of documents published by city councils, and press articles 
that allow identification of the Mayor’s party at the time the PPP was signed.6
Population: Total Population (in thousands) of the Metropolitan Area where the PPP was signed 
(and its square) are used to capture the size of the market. Private investors are likely to be more 
willing to provide facilities in highly populated markets. We expect that larger markets will result in 
greater private involvement. 
Wastewater: A dummy variable set to one for wastewater services and zero for water delivery 
services. This variable captures different contractual choice patterns derived from the type of 
service contracted. The data source for this variable is also the Public Works Financing database.
Year: This additional control variable identifies the year in which the PPP was signed. It controls 
for any drivers of contract choice related to time. 
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5. Methods and estimation results
Methods
We use different estimation models to evaluate the impact of these regressors on the extent of 
private participation in completed PPPs. Our sample is a pool of local PPP projects in the water 
sector signed in the United States over the last 25 years. We are unable, however, to follow 
particular PPP projects across time, and do not have access to particular characteristics of 
contracts beyond the ones used in this analysis.7 As a result we have a pool of different projects 
signed in different time periods. Monetary variables are not affected by this time difference 
because they are ratios where both monetary values are measured in the same time period. Also, 
we account for time trend with the inclusion of the variable Year.
We use two estimation strategies. We first use an ordered logit model to estimate the Ordered 
Contract dependent variable. We then estimate a standard logit model using Binary Contract as
the dependent variable because the ordered logit assumes a monotone, one dimensional 
relationship between the latent and unobserved variable. We also consider the concentration of 
contract types within the Management Contracts and Concession/BOT categories, which leads us 
to utilize a binary variable distinguishing between large and small private involvement. Indeed, the 
privatization literature has typically focused on the decision of whether to privatize (contract out) 
or not, which has led to widespread use of logit and probit models. Indeed, one of our key 
contributions is the use of models that consider different privatization intensities. We thus utilize 
models applicable to categorical ordered discrete dependent variables.
The specification of the above models includes all regressors for both estimation strategies 
(ordered logistic and standard logistic) presented above and is as follows:
              (1)
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We applied a specification error test and a multicollinearity diagnostic to these models. The first 
test for specification error (linktest in STATA) shows the meaningfulness of covariates chosen, the 
absence of omitted variable bias, and a correct assumption for the specified link function. The 
second test for multicollinearity (variance inflation factors) finds no significant collinearity in our 
specification.8
Estimation Results
Table 3 below displays our main estimates. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates for ordered logit 
and the standard logit models, respectively. These estimates indicate that fiscal variables and 
political variables are not relevant for the determination of PPP contract type in the water industry. 
Two economic variables, contract size coverage and the wage ratio, display positive and 
significant coefficients.
On the one hand, our results indicate that project attractiveness as measured by contract 
coverage is a significant determinant of private involvement and contract choice. Indeed, we find a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between private participation and the ratio of 
income to contract size. Recall this is the variable capturing the risk transferred to the private 
sector. Private sector participation is higher where it is easier to recover costs. This suggests that 
local governments are only able to significantly involve the private sector in PPPs where the 
commercial risk transferred is relatively lower. 
On the other hand, the cost of labor for local governments relative to private labor is statistically 
significant and displays the expected positive sign. When public servants are more expensive, 
that is, when they receive higher wages than private workers in a given State, those governments 
have stronger incentives to promote PPPs with higher private involvement in the U.S. water 
industry. Behind this relationship we find an efficiency motivation due to the greater ability of 
private firms to operate with lower labor costs. In terms of marginal effects we find an estimate of 
1.05. The probability change from 0 to 1 for the logit model associated with this variable is 0.45. 
As a result, we find that the economic cost of labor in the water industry is an important 
determinant of the role of private partners in PPP projects.
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Our results also indicate that the size of the market is important for the determination of PPPs. 
The population variable indicates that, as expected, the largest markets with more potential 
consumers in the water industry do increase the presence of private partners in the PPP due to 
higher demand levels that may diminish risk and demand uncertainty. However, we find that this 
relationship is non-linear.
We also find no differences between water delivery and wastewater treatment services. 
However, the time trend indicates that private involvement is larger in PPPs signed in more recent 
years, suggesting that private participation is growing over time.
Table 3. Ordered logistic and logistic estimates for PPP contract choice.
Regressors Ordered 
Logit
Logit 
(Coef.)
Marginal 
Effects
Contract_ Coverage 0.0029**
(1.90)
0.0028* 
(1.82)
-0.0001
Tax_Burden - 3.3016
(-0.31)
-0.2977
(-0.03)
-1.3254
Spending_Limit -0.7369
(-1.50)
-0.809
(-1.57)
-0.2017
Ratio_Wages 4.5777***
(2.65)
4.6347**
(2.37)
1.0524
Republican_Mayor -0.6378
(-1.31)
-0.5220
(-1.08)
-0.0514
Population -0.0051**
(-2.33)
-0.0052** 
(2.35)
-0.0011
Population2 4.20e-12**
(2.35)
4.31e-12** 
(2.36)
1.17e-12
Wastewater 0.2230
(0.52)
0.3964
(0.91)
0.0224
Year 0.2065***
(3.37)
0.2064***
(3.35)
0.0339
N. observations 108 108
Log pseudolikelihood -74.86 -61.47
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.17
Note: T-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** 
at 1%
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Table 3 also presents the marginal effects of each variable on the probabilities of utilizing a 
high (or very high) level of private involvement. Marginal effects are calculated when all variables 
are evaluated at their means. This allows us to identify the magnitude of the effects produced by 
statistically significant coefficients. Wage differentials between private and public workers are the 
major determinant of private involvement in U.S. water PPPs. Although Contract Coverage is 
statistically significant, its economic significance as reflected in its impact on probabilities is much 
less than the ratio of wages.
Political variables are also of interest. Our estimates indicate no differences across political 
parties. This suggests that PPPs are decided under pragmatic rather than ideological views. One 
possibility is that partnerships are not viewed as privatisation and more pro-government parties 
might be more open to arrangements that are viewed as “partnerships” rather than as
privatizations. Another possibility is that Republican mayors and Democratic Party mayors do not 
differ in terms of their attitudes towards the extent of private involvement  in the USA.9
6. Conclusions
Private delivery of urban water services has not generally provided better productivity and 
efficiency outcomes than public delivery. Nonetheless, and particularly in the less developed 
countries, private production has delivered enhanced quality and accessibility. Mixed outcomes 
from privatization in several sectors has led to reforms that go beyond the pure-public/pure-private 
divide, and increased using of public-private partnerships can be seen as one result of such a 
trend. Greater PPP use has generated a variety of degrees of involvement of private partners in 
the delivery of public services. However, empirical analysis of the motivations for public services 
privatization has remained largely within the domain of pure-public versus pure-private delivery. 
We contribute to the literature by empirically analyzing factors explaining different degrees of 
private involvement through PPPs in the water sector. Our estimates indicate that a variety of 
factors lead to greater private participation through public-private partnerships in the water 
industry. We find that the risk associated with cost recovery as measured in terms of the relative 
size of contract cost with respect to the purchasing power of the market (income per capita) is a 
driver of private participation. However, the magnitude of this effect is not very large. 
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We also find that the relative cost of labor is another key factor explaining the extent of private 
involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are high relative to private wages, private 
participation might be viewed as a source of efficiency gains due to lower salaries. In all, we find 
two sources motivating greater private involvement: one encouraging private participation by 
reducing risk, and another encouraging government to seek out private participation in order to 
lower its costs. 
Going beyond the pure-public/pure-private split in the delivery of public services allows new 
understanding of government’s decisions on this margin. Future research –by means of larger 
samples- should focus on further distinguishing among different types of PPPs, and on extending 
this type of analysis to other sectors. 
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Notes
1. It is worth noting that other non empirical papers have provided interesting insights in factors 
influencing privatization of water services, as that of interest groups and institutional structures 
of power (Fitch, 2007). See as well Bel, Hebdon and Warner (2007).
2. Bel and Fageda (2008) conduct an empirical analysis where they merge data on solid waste 
and on water. They find that water is less prone to contracting than solid waste.
3. In a more recent paper, Picazo-Tadeo et al (2012) use the same data base to conduct a 
detailed study on political and ideological factors.
4. Available at: http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/topic/9.html (accessed November 16, 
2011).
5. Data for this variable were obtained from Table 1: Tax and Expenditure Limitations Currently 
Imposed Statewide on Local Governments, in Mullins and Wallin (2004). See the appendix for 
a more detailed description of the construction of this variable.
6. There are, however, several other variables included in the Public Works Financing database, 
such as contract duration and private firm identification, which cannot be exploited due to the 
number of missing values such that the number of observations would be significantly reduced. 
Indeed, the inclusion of the Contract Size variable reduces the number of observations from 
165 to 108.
7. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) = 1.16 < 10 (Rule of thumb)
8. Geddes and Wagner (2012), however, find a large effect of political party affiliation on the 
likelihood that a state passes a public-private partnerships enabling law in a particular year.
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Appendix
A1. Correlation matrix
Contract_ 
Coverage
Tax_Burden Spending_Limit Ratio_Wages Republican_Mayor Population Wastewater Year
Contract_ 
Coverage
-
Tax_Burden -0.14 -
Spending_Limit -0.06 0.08 -
Ratio_Wages 0.00 0.05 0.32 -
Republican_Mayor 0.17 0.01 -0.18 -0.10 -
Population 0.57 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 -
Wastewater 0.03 -0.06 -0.18 -0.06 0.12 0.01 -
Year -0.06 0.30 0.07 -0.28 -0.05 0.15 -0.16 -
A2. Source for Republican Mayor Variable
The Republican_Mayor variable was created in several steps. First, the names of mayors for 
relevant cities were gathered using the Municipal Year Book reference collection (various years), 
which provides data on many local governments across the United States.
Second, Access World News (various dates), which is a worldwide news archives database, was 
used to locate newspapers from those cities. Newspaper archives were then searched to 
determine the individual mayor’s political party affiliation. 
Twenty-four mayors (out of 163) were not affiliated with any political party. In those cases, party 
affiliation of the chief elected county official was used if it could be located. In other cases, using 
political affiliation of the county official was more appropriate given the nature and scope of the 
PPP, and again the political party of the chief elected county official was recorded. If there were 
multiple county commissioners or no clear chief commissioner, and political affiliation of the mayor 
could not be determined, the data point was delineated missing.  
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2012/22 pàg. 27
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2012/22 pag. 27
27
Llista Document de Treball
List Working Paper
WP 2012/22 “Recovery Risk and Labor Costs in Public-Private-Partnerships: Contractual Choice in the 
U.S. Water industry” Albalate, D, Bel, G. and Geddes, R.
WP 2012/21 “Beyond pure public and pure private management models: Mixed firms in the European 
Airport Industry” Albalate, D.; Bel, G. and Fageda, X.
WP 2012/20 “The determinants of contractual choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in 
the United States” Albalate, D, Bel, G. and Geddes, R.
WP 2012/19 “Measuring Sovereign Bond Spillover in Europe and the Impact of Rating News” Claeys, P. 
	

WP 2012/18 “Entry Regulation Asymmetries and Gasoline Competition in a Mixed Motorway Network”
Albalate, D. and Perdiguero, J.
WP 2012/17 “Regulation of Port Charges in Spain: Global versus Local Competition” Fageda, X. and 
Gonzalez-Aregall, M.
WP 2012/16 “Pass-through in dollarized countries: should Ecuador abandon the U.S. Dollar?” Marí del 
Cristo, M.L. and Gómez-Puig, M.
WP 2012/15 “A Note on the Relationship Between the Cyclicality of Markups and Fiscal Policy” Claeys, 
P. and Costa, L.F.
WP 2012/14 “Do intra- and inter-industry spillovers matter? CDM model estimates for Spain” Goya, E.; 
Vayá, E and Suriñach, J.
WP 2012/13 “What Drives the Choice of Partners in R&D Cooperation? Heterogeneity across Sectors”
Badillo, E. and Moreno, R.
WP 2012/12 “Corruption and local politics: does it pay to be a crook?” Jiménez, J.L. and García, C.
WP 2012/11 “Not always sunny in paradise: prices and brand diversity in touristic areas supermarkets”
Campos, J.; Jiménez, J.L. and Suárez-Alemán, A.
WP 2012/10 “The institutional, economic and social determinants of local government transparency”
Albalate, D.
WP 2012/09 “The business excellence attraction composite index (BEACI). Design and apllication to the 
municipalities of the Barcelona province” Murillo, J.; Romaní, J.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2012/08 “Policy options for the promotion of electric vehicles: a review” Perdiguero, J. and Jiménez, 
J.L.
WP 2012/07 “Price differences between domestic and international air markets: an empirical application 
to routes from Gran Canaria” Fageda, X.; Jiménez, J.L. and Díaz Santamaría, C.
WP 2012/06 “Building a “quality in work” index in Spain” López-Tamayo, J.; Royuela, V. and Suriñach, J.
WP 2012/05 “Mergers and difference-in-difference estimator: why firms do not increase prices?”
Jiménez, J.L. and Perdiguero, J.
WP 2012/04 “What attracts knowledge workers? The role of space, social connections, institutions, jobs 
and amenities” Miguélez, E. and Moreno, R.
WP 2012/03 “What Drives the Urban Wage Premium? Evidence along the Wage Distribution” Matano, A. 
and Naticchioni, P.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2012/22 pàg. 28
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2012/22 pag. 28
28
WP 2012/02 “Location Patterns of Creative Capital and Regional Disparities in Spain” Kerimoglu, E. and 
Karahasan, B.C.
WP 2012/01 “The connection between distortion risk measures and ordered weighted averaging 
operators” Belles-Sampera, J.; Merigó, J.M.; Guillén, M. and Santolino, M.
WP 2011/26 “Productivity and innovation spillovers: Micro evidence from Spain” Goya, E.; Vayá, E. and 
Suriñach, J.
WP 2011/25 “The regional distribution of unemployment. What do micro-data tell us?” López-Bazo, E. 
and Motellón, E.
WP 2011/24 “Vertical relations and local competition: an empirical approach” Perdiguero, J.
WP 2011/23 “Air services on thin routes: Regional versus low-cost airlines” Fageda, X. and Flores-Fillol,
R.
WP 2011/22 “Measuring early childhood health: a composite index comparing Colombian departments”
Osorio, A.M.; Bolancé, C. and Alcañiz, M.
WP 2011/21 “A relational approach to the geography of innovation: a typology of regions” Moreno, R. 
and Miguélez, E.
WP 2011/20 “Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?” Jiménez, J.L and Perdiguero, J.
WP 2011/19 “Factors affecting hospital admission and recovery stay duration of in-patient motor victims 
in Spain” Santolino, M.; Bolancé, C. and Alcañiz, M.
WP 2011/18 “Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? An empirical analysis”
Bel, G.; Fageda, X. and Mur, M.
WP 2011/17 “The "farthest" need the best. Human capital composition and development-specific 
economic growth” Manca, F.
WP 2011/16 “Causality and contagion in peripheral EMU public debt markets: a dynamic approach”
Gómez-Puig, M. and Sosvilla-Rivero, S.
WP 2011/15 “The influence of decision-maker effort and case complexity on appealed rulings subject to 
multi-categorical selection” Santolino, M. and Söderberg, M. 
WP 2011/14 “Agglomeration, Inequality and Economic Growth” Castells, D. and Royuela, V. 
WP 2011/13 “A correlation sensitivity analysis of non-life underwriting risk in solvency capital 
requirement estimation” Bermúdez, L.; Ferri, A. and Guillén, M. 
WP 2011/12 “Assessing agglomeration economies in a spatial framework with endogenous regressors”
Artis, M.J.; Miguélez, E. and Moreno, R. 
WP 2011/11 “Privatization, cooperation and costs of solid waste services in small towns” Bel, G; Fageda, 
X. and Mur, M.
WP 2011/10 “Privatization and PPPS in transportation infrastructure: Network effects of increasing user 
fees” Albalate, D. and Bel, G.
WP 2011/09 “Debating as a classroom tool for adapting learning outcomes to the European higher 
education area”     Jiménez, J.L.; Perdiguero, J. and Suárez, A.
WP 2011/08 “Influence of the claimant’s behavioural features on motor compensation outcomes” Ayuso, 
M; Bermúdez L. and Santolino, M.
WP 2011/07 “Geography of talent and regional differences in Spain” Karahasan, B.C. and Kerimoglu E.
WP 2011/06 “How Important to a City Are Tourists and Daytrippers? The Economic Impact of Tourism 
on The City of Barcelona” Murillo, J; Vayá, E; Romaní, J. and Suriñach, J. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2012/22 pàg. 29
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2012/22 pag. 29
29
WP 2011/05 “Singling out individual inventors from patent data” Miguélez,E. and Gómez-Miguélez, I.
WP 2011/04 “¿La sobreeducación de los padres afecta al rendimiento académico de sus hijos?” Nieto, 
S; Ramos, R.
WP 2011/03 “The Transatlantic Productivity Gap: Is R&D the Main Culprit?” Ortega-Argilés, R.; Piva, M.; 
and Vivarelli, M. 
WP 2011/02 “The Spatial Distribution of Human Capital: Can It Really Be Explained by Regional 
Differences in Market Access?” Karahasan, B.C. and López-Bazo, E
WP 2011/01 “I If you want me to stay, pay” . Claeys, P and Martire, F
WP 2010/16 “Infrastructure and nation building: The regulation and financing of network transportation 
infrastructures in Spain (1720-2010)”Bel,G
WP 2010/15 “Fiscal policy and economic stability: does PIGS stand for Procyclicality In Government 
Spending?” Maravalle, A ; Claeys, P.
WP 2010/14 “Economic and social convergence in Colombia” Royuela, V;  Adolfo García, G.
WP 2010/13 “Symmetric or asymmetric gasoline prices? A meta-analysis approach” Perdiguero, J.
WP 2010/12 “Ownership, Incentives and Hospitals” Fageda,X and Fiz, E.
WP 2010/11 “Prediction of the economic cost of individual long-term care in the Spanish population”
Bolancé, C; Alemany, R ; and Guillén M
WP 2010/10 “On the Dynamics of Exports and FDI: The Spanish Internationalization Process” Martínez-
Martín J.
WP 2010/09 “Urban transport governance reform in Barcelona” Albalate, D ;  Bel, G and Calzada, J.
WP 2010/08 “Cómo (no) adaptar una asignatura al EEES: Lecciones desde la experiencia comparada 
en España” Florido C. ; Jiménez JL.  and  Perdiguero J.
WP 2010/07 “Price rivalry in airline markets: A study of a successful strategy of a network carrier against 
a low-cost carrier” Fageda, X ; Jiménez J.L. ; Perdiguero , J.
WP 2010/06 “La reforma de la contratación en el mercado de trabajo: entre la flexibilidad y la seguridad” 
Royuela V. and Manuel Sanchis M.
WP 2010/05 “Discrete distributions when modeling the disability severity score of motor victims”
Boucher, J and Santolino, M
WP 2010/04 “Does privatization spur regulation? Evidence from the regulatory reform of European 
airports . Bel, G. and Fageda, X.”
WP  2010/03  “High-Speed Rail: Lessons for Policy Makers from Experiences Abroad”. Albalate, D ; and
Bel, G.”
WP  2010/02 “Speed limit laws in America: Economics, politics and geography”. Albalate, D ; and Bel, G.”
WP  2010/01  “Research Networks and Inventors’ Mobility as Drivers of Innovation: Evidence from 
Europe” Miguélez, E. ;  Moreno, R. ”
WP 2009/26 ”Social Preferences and Transport Policy: The case of US speed limits” Albalate, D. 
WP 2009/25 ”Human Capital Spillovers Productivity and Regional Convergence in Spain” , Ramos, R ; 
Artis, M.; Suriñach, J. 
WP 2009/24 “Human Capital and Regional Wage Gaps” ,López-Bazo,E. Motellón E. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2012/22 pàg. 30
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2012/22 pag. 30
30
WP 2009/23 “Is Private Production of Public Services Cheaper than Public Production? A meta-
regression analysis of solid waste and water services” Bel, G.; Fageda, X.; Warner. M.E.
WP 2009/22 “Institutional Determinants of Military Spending” Bel, G., Elias-Moreno, F.
WP 2009/21 “Fiscal Regime Shifts in Portugal” Afonso, A., Claeys, P., Sousa, R.M.
WP 2009/20 “Health care utilization among immigrants and native-born populations in 11 European 
countries. Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe” Solé-Auró, 
A., Guillén, M., Crimmins, E.M.
WP 2009/19 “La efectividad de las políticas activas de mercado de trabajo para luchar contra el paro. La 
experiencia de Cataluña” Ramos, R., Suriñach, J., Artís, M.
WP 2009/18 “Is the Wage Curve Formal or Informal? Evidence for Colombia” Ramos, R., Duque, J.C., 
Suriñach, J.
WP 2009/17 “General Equilibrium Long-Run Determinants for Spanish FDI: A Spatial Panel Data 
Approach” Martínez-Martín, J.
WP 2009/16 “Scientists on the move: tracing scientists’ mobility and its spatial distribution” Miguélez, E.; 
Moreno, R.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2009/15 “The First Privatization Policy in a Democracy: Selling State-Owned Enterprises in 1948-
1950 Puerto Rico” Bel, G.
WP 2009/14 “Appropriate IPRs, Human Capital Composition and Economic Growth” Manca, F.
WP 2009/13 “Human Capital Composition and Economic Growth at a Regional Level” Manca, F.
WP 2009/12 “Technology Catching-up and the Role of Institutions” Manca, F. 
WP 2009/11 “A missing spatial link in institutional quality” Claeys, P.; Manca, F.
WP 2009/10 “Tourism and Exports as a means of Growth” Cortés-Jiménez, I.; Pulina, M.; Riera i 
Prunera, C.; Artís, M.
WP 2009/09 “Evidence on the role of ownership structure on firms' innovative performance” Ortega-
Argilés, R.; Moreno, R.
WP 2009/08 “¿Por qué se privatizan servicios en los municipios (pequeños)? Evidencia empírica sobre 
residuos sólidos y agua” Bel, G.; Fageda, X.; Mur, M.
WP 2009/07 “Empirical analysis of solid management waste costs: Some evidence from Galicia, Spain”
Bel, G.; Fageda, X.
WP 2009/06 “Intercontinental fligths from European Airports: Towards hub concentration or not?” Bel, G.; 
Fageda, X.
WP 2009/05 “Factors explaining urban transport systems in large European cities: A cross-sectional 
approach” Albalate, D.; Bel, G.
WP 2009/04 “Regional economic growth and human capital: the role of overeducation” Ramos, R.; 
Suriñach, J.; Artís, M.
WP 2009/03 “Regional heterogeneity in wage distributions. Evidence from Spain” Motellón, E.; López-
Bazo, E.; El-Attar, M.
WP 2009/02 “Modelling the disability severity score in motor insurance claims: an application to the 
Spanish case” Santolino, M.; Boucher, J.P.
WP 2009/01 “Quality in work and aggregate productivity” Royuela, V.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2008/16 “Intermunicipal cooperation and privatization of solid waste services among small 
municipalities in Spain” Bel, G.; Mur, M.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2012/22 pàg. 31
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2012/22 pag. 31
31
WP 2008/15 “Similar problems, different solutions: Comparing refuse collection in the Netherlands and 
Spain” Bel, G.; Dijkgraaf, E.; Fageda, X.; Gradus, R.
WP 2008/14 “Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury settlements awarded by 
Spanish trial courts” Santolino, M
WP 2008/13 “Does social capital reinforce technological inputs in the creation of knowledge? Evidence 
from the Spanish regions” Miguélez, E.; Moreno, R.; Artís, M.
WP 2008/12 “Testing the FTPL across government tiers” Claeys, P.; Ramos, R.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2008/11 “Internet Banking in Europe: a comparative analysis” Arnaboldi, F.; Claeys, P.
WP 2008/10 “Fiscal policy and interest rates: the role of financial and economic integration” Claeys, P.; 
Moreno, R.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2008/09 “Health of Immigrants in European countries” Solé-Auró, A.; M.Crimmins, E.
WP 2008/08 “The Role of Firm Size in Training Provision Decisions: evidence from Spain” Castany, L.
WP 2008/07 “Forecasting the maximum compensation offer in the automobile BI claims negotiation 
process” Ayuso, M.; Santolino, M.
WP 2008/06 “Prediction of individual automobile RBNS claim reserves in the context of Solvency II” 
Ayuso, M.; Santolino, M. 
WP 2008/05 “Panel Data Stochastic Convergence Analysis of the Mexican Regions” Carrion-i-Silvestre, 
J.L.; German-Soto, V.
WP 2008/04 “Local privatization, intermunicipal cooperation, transaction costs and political interests: 
Evidence from Spain” Bel, G.; Fageda, X.
WP 2008/03 “Choosing hybrid organizations for local services delivery: An empirical analysis of partial 
privatization” Bel, G.; Fageda, X.
WP 2008/02 “Motorways, tolls and road safety. Evidence from European Panel Data” Albalate, D.; Bel, 
G.
WP 2008/01 “Shaping urban traffic patterns through congestion charging: What factors drive success or 
failure?” Albalate, D.; Bel, G.
WP 2007/19 “La distribución regional de la temporalidad en España. Análisis de sus determinantes” 
Motellón, E.
WP 2007/18 “Regional returns to physical capital: are they conditioned by educational attainment?” 
López-Bazo, E.; Moreno, R.
WP 2007/17 “Does human capital stimulate investment in physical capital? evidence from a cost system 
framework” López-Bazo, E.; Moreno, R.
WP 2007/16 “Do innovation and human capital explain the productivity gap between small and large 
firms?” Castany, L.; López-Bazo, E.; Moreno, R.
WP 2007/15 “Estimating the effects of fiscal policy under the budget constraint” Claeys, P.
WP 2007/14 “Fiscal sustainability across government tiers: an assessment of soft budget constraints” 
Claeys, P.; Ramos, R.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2007/13 “The institutional vs. the academic definition of the quality of work life. What is the focus of 
the European Commission?” Royuela, V.; López-Tamayo, J.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2007/12 “Cambios en la distribución salarial en españa, 1995-2002. Efectos a través del tipo de 
contrato” Motellón, E.; López-Bazo, E.; El-Attar, M.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2012/22 pàg. 32
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2012/22 pag. 32
32
WP 2007/11 “EU-15 sovereign governments’ cost of borrowing after seven years of monetary union” 
Gómez-Puig, M..
WP 2007/10 “Another Look at the Null of Stationary Real Exchange Rates: Panel Data with Structural 
Breaks and Cross-section Dependence” Syed A. Basher; Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.L.
WP 2007/09 “Multicointegration, polynomial cointegration and I(2) cointegration with structural breaks. 
An application to the sustainability of the US external deficit” Berenguer-Rico, V.; Carrion-i-
Silvestre, J.L.
WP 2007/08 “Has concentration evolved similarly in manufacturing and services? A sensitivity analysis” 
Ruiz-Valenzuela, J.; Moreno-Serrano, R.; Vaya-Valcarce, E.
WP 2007/07 “Defining housing market areas using commuting and migration algorithms. Catalonia 
(Spain) as an applied case study” Royuela, C.; Vargas, M.
WP 2007/06 “Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term 
Contracts” Albalate, D.; Bel, G.
WP 2007/05 “Decomposing differences in total factor productivity across firm size” Castany, L.; Lopez-
Bazo, E.; Moreno, R.
WP 2007/04 “Privatization and Regulation of Toll Motorways in Europe” Albalate, D.; Bel, G.; Fageda, X.
WP 2007/03 “Is the influence of quality of life on urban growth non-stationary in space? A case study of 
Barcelona” Royuela, V.; Moreno, R.; Vayá, E.
WP 2007/02 “Sustainability of EU fiscal policies. A panel test” Claeys, P.
WP 2007/01 “Research networks and scientific production in Economics: The recent spanish 
experience” Duque, J.C.; Ramos, R.; Royuela, V.
WP 2006/10 “Term structure of interest rate. European financial integration” Fontanals-Albiol, H.; Ruiz-
Dotras, E.; Bolancé-Losilla, C.
WP 2006/09 “Patrones de publicación internacional (ssci) de los autores afiliados a universidades 
españolas, en el ámbito económico-empresarial (1994-2004)” Suriñach, J.; Duque, J.C.; 
Royuela, V.
WP 2006/08 “Supervised regionalization methods: A survey” Duque, J.C.; Ramos, R.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2006/07 “Against the mainstream: nazi privatization in 1930s germany” Bel, G.
WP 2006/06 “Economía Urbana y Calidad de Vida. Una revisión del estado del conocimiento en 
España” Royuela, V.; Lambiri, D.; Biagi, B. 
WP 2006/05 “Calculation of the variance in surveys of the economic climate” Alcañiz, M.; Costa, A.; 
Guillén, M.; Luna, C.; Rovira, C.
WP 2006/04 “Time-varying effects when analysing customer lifetime duration: application to the 
insurance market” Guillen, M.; Nielsen, J.P.; Scheike, T.; Perez-Marin, A.M.
WP 2006/03 “Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives the european experience” Albalate, D.
WP 2006/02 “An analysis of the determinants in economics and business publications by spanish 
universities between 1994 and 2004” Ramos, R.; Royuela, V.; Suriñach, J.
WP 2006/01 “Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: empirical evidence using microdata” Artís, M.; 
Ramos, R.; Suriñach, J.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                             Document de Treball   2012/22 pàg. 33
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2012/22 pag. 33
33
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
